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MAKING A CASE FOR REFRAMING NARRATIVES OF PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA 
’Funmi Olonisakin & Muteru Ndumo 
INTRODUCTION 
The elusive search for stable peace continues to consume the attention of 
local and international society, not least the United Nations. The problem of 
conflict relapse is perhaps the biggest dilemma faced by conflict resolution 
mechanism of the United Nations and regional organisations alike. About half of 
the situations of conflict and insecurity on the agenda of the UN Security Council in 
recent times are of situations where huge investments had previously been made 
in the pursuit of peace.1 More than two-thirds of those cases of relapse are of 
conflict situations in Africa.2 The conflict and security terrain in Africa has 
transmuted significantly in the last two decades such that agendas and 
architectures devised for peace have been blunted by new conflict dynamics. All of 
this has generated an even more critical look at the global peace architecture and 
its application in Africa.   
This paper interrogates common and established understanding and 
application of peacebuilding in Africa. It argues that Africa’s experiences thus far, 
suggest an alternative narrative and pathway toward building inherently peaceful 
and viable states. Current approaches to peacebuilding rely on a dominant 
narrative that constructs a particular model of state as a prerequisite to 
sustainable peace. As such, interventions in societies affected by armed conflict 
focus on the transfer of a model that is expected to lead to peace and stability. This 
approach, which sees African states, as they ought to be rather than as they 
actually are, is inherently flawed. First, rarely does the dominant discourse of 
peacebuilding construe the outbreaks of intractable conflicts, which sometimes, 
and paradoxically, threaten the very survival of African states, and the efforts to 
reconcile society, as part of a continuum of conversation inherent in state making 
and state-building processes. Yet in many cases, those conflicts are the products of 
intractable disagreements that are fundamental to the process of state building 
internal to the affected societies. Second and related, peacebuilding interventions 
are invariably guided by particular notions of “peace” and of the “state” held by the 
interveners, which undermine prospects for stable peace in these contexts. Those 
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notions of peace and models of state are often not realizable in contexts and times 
quite different from the ones in which they were developed. It is assumed that an 
end to violence and a sustaining of stable peace can be achieved by creating a 
particular type of state, which has been tried and tested elsewhere. 
This paper therefore argues that the pursuit of peace should be conceived 
as part of the conversations inherent in, and underpinning state building processes 
rather than a particular model of statehood and its institutional infrastructure. In 
this regard, many situations of armed conflict in post-independence and post-Cold 
War Africa are the result of conversations, violent or otherwise, taking place 
between various segments of society in the specific national contexts. And those 
conversations might require a distinctly different solution, process or time frame 
from the models currently offered in the response by interveners or leading actors. 
Arguably, any attempt to build stable peace must return to those conversations 
rather than short-circuit them through the imposition of particular models of state 
building in ways that do not take into account the nature and content of the 
conversations that occurred before those societies slid into violence. As such, the 
logic of peacebuilding is to be found not in a pre-determined model of state 
building but in the interaction occurring within the target state, among elite and 
between elite and society. The nature and the form that these state building 
conversations assume will be part of the focus of this paper.  
In pursuit of this argument, this paper addresses itself to two key questions: 
First, how relevant are the dominant narratives of peacebuilding to the African 
experience? Second, to what extent do common types of political and peace 
settlements create opportunities for a return to the state building conversations 
that predate armed conflict? The terms, political settlement and peace settlement 
are used interchangeably. Two types of peace settlements form the focus of 
attention here – those that ended in victory on the battlefield for one party and 
defeat for other(s); and those that were the result of negotiated settlement. Does 
one type of settlement accommodate pre-war conversations about state building? 
Is sustainable peace more discernable as a result? This paper cites and discusses a 
number of conflict situations in Africa, which ended through different forms of 
political settlements as illustrative examples. It makes a distinction between two 
main types of violent and armed conflict settings. The first consists of those 
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situations of armed conflict where violence ended on the battlefield such as 
Ethiopia and Rwanda. The second includes situations where the end of violence as 
well as post-conflict agenda was negotiated and facilitated either internally or by 
external interveners such as the United Nations or regional organisations. 
Somaliland is an example of a largely internally facilitated settlement while South 
Sudan is an example of an externally facilitated one. An examination of these 
settings might enable one make better sense of the trajectories of various 
peacebuilding approaches and the extent to which they help to set conflict affected 
societies on the course of nation and state building in ways that produce stable 
peace.  
This paper is organised in five further sections following this introduction. 
The second discusses the dominant narratives of peace and relevance for Africa. 
The third presents the notion of conversation, its underlying features and 
assumptions and its potential as a pathway to building and sustaining peace in 
Africa.  The fourth examines some illustrative examples of political/ peace 
settlements in Africa and their connection to the dominant and alternative 
narratives. The fifth and final section offers some concluding remarks. 
 
DOMINANT NARRATIVES OF PEACE AND RELEVANCE FOR AFRICA 
With few exceptions, much of the oft-cited ideas and discourses on the pursuit of 
peace are Western in origin. Dominant ideas of war and peace have evolved from 
classical to 20th Century philosophers and writers. To varying degrees, these ideas 
are now embedded in the strategies for peace in societies that were not even 
remotely in the consideration of those shaping political thought and ideas of peace 
across those periods. Thomas Hobbes was pre-occupied by the events in England 
(the English civil war must not have been far from his mind) when he was writing 
about the original “state of nature” and the perils of the struggle for individual 
power. For Hobbes, ideally, the state or commonwealth – his Leviathan – created 
from popular consent, would safeguard peace. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 
would come to settle the central question of the state’s sovereignty. John Locke, 
writing a few decades after Hobbes, reflected on the need to check the powers of 
the state by dividing its core functions between legislative and executive branches. 
It was essential, to preserve the natural rights of human beings, derived from God-
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given, Natural Law. In that Age of Enlightenment, which was also a period of social 
upheaval and industrial revolution, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that less 
importance should be accorded to the right of individuals given that the wealthy 
could maintain unequal power and privilege under the guise of equal rights to 
attain that status. Instead, the idea of the Social Contract ensures that the rights of 
the individual are subsumed in the general will for the pursuit of the collective 
wellbeing, the “common good”.  
Such contestation of ideas, and debate about what ought to constitute valid 
knowledge and future direction amid changing situations and changeable human 
condition is critical to the growth and development of every society. There is much 
to be learned from these European ideas and experiences. Arguably, the quest for 
stable peace and justice and the desire of every human being to reach her or his 
full potential in a peaceful, certainly prosperous society is universal and holds true 
across time and space. What has held true for the people of Europe and America 
for centuries (for which written records are widely available) is also true for the 
peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This is so, even if for many of these 
recent and developing states, contestations about the governing of life in common 
have yet to produce a settled frame around which to build their collective future. 
However, the cautionary thread that runs through this paper is that the pursuit of 
ideals of stable peace that are universally sought cannot be interchanged with 
models of governance deemed to be universally transferrable across time and 
space.  
While many societies may have settled the issue of the governance models 
best suited to their situations, the escalation of conflict to armed and destructive 
levels remains a real challenge globally. The search for stable peace, between and 
within states, has undergone major evolution in the last century, throwing up 
theories and strategies for peace that offer much insight even if they cannot be 
adopted wholesale in other contexts. Here, particular focus is placed first, on the 
evolutions of the ideas of peace as shaped by Immanuel Kant and Johan Galtung; 
and second, on the dominant approach to peacebuilding in war-affected societies 
since the 1990s.  
Kant’s notion of perpetual peace required a permanent end to war between 
states. It meant going beyond reaching a mere truce or temporary cessation of 
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hostilities between the armies of sovereign states. Continuous peace between 
sovereign states would be realised only when those states ceased to be controlled 
by rulers for whom the people were mere subjects. Perpetual peace is possible 
when the state is the product of citizens who, through the exercise of their natural 
inalienable rights, create a body of laws, a republican constitution, which embodies 
their collective will and governs their state. In such a Republic, it is citizens, and 
not rulers, who define the basis on which war would be waged, if war will be 
waged. Although Kant made a distinction between such Republics and 
democracies, seeing the latter as one that harbours much basis for revolution, the 
idea that representative democracies do not go to war against each other has held 
true for the greater part of the last century. This has indeed come to influence the 
liberal peacebuilding approach discussed later. 
Violent conflict has continued to be a feature of life within states albeit to 
varying degrees, even in so-called democracies. Galtungs’s conception of peace is 
perhaps one of the seminal contributions of the last half-century in advancing 
understanding of the deep-rooted causes of violent conflict in society. For Galtung, 
peace is the absence of violence, which is not just physical violence. He 
distinguishes between personal and direct violence, and structural and indirect 
violence.3 The absence of the first results in negative peace, while the absence of 
the latter produces positive peace.4 Galtung observes that in the same way that 
violence is conceived of in this two-sided form, peace can equally be seen as two-
sided – the absence of personal/direct violence and the absence of 
structural/indirect violence – to which he refers as negative peace and positive 
peace respectively.5 While structural violence does not cause direct physical harm, 
Galtung argues that it is built into the structure and ‘shows up as unequal power 
and consequently as unequal life chances’.6  
The period after the end of the Cold War saw a rise in incidents of armed 
conflict, particularly within states, in places like former Yugoslavia and in parts of 
Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw a reconfiguration of the states of 
Eastern Europe. The brutal nature and impact of the civil wars in Liberia, former 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Sierra-Leone, Burundi and the genocide in Rwanda – all of 
which broke out between 1989 and 1994, drove home the harsh reality of the post-
Cold War World. The pressure to respond to these conflicts was enormous not 
 
7 
least because of the scale of humanitarian tragedies. The recruitment of children as 
soldiers in Liberia and Sierra Leone (many of who committed vicious atrocities), 
the amputation of limbs of innocent Sierra Leoneans for no other reason than 
exercising their right to vote as an alternative to rebellion, and the mass atrocities 
in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda where almost one million people were 
massacred in 90 days, shocked the conscience of the global community. In Africa, 
this class of conflict, intra-state armed conflict became the order of the day as 
further outbreaks of civil war occurred in Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire and other 
places.  
Former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace in 1992,7 
and its sequel in 1995 were primarily an attempt to find solutions to the situations 
of armed conflict that increasingly posed a threat to international peace and 
security. Agenda for peace set the scene for the application of a liberal 
peacebuilding approach. The plan for returning war-affected societies to peace and 
stability involved a multi-level restoration of governance from local to 
international levels through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding and peace enforcement. The sequential but inter-connected nature of 
these activities was evident in the initial response to various situations of armed 
conflict. The effort to get warring parties to agree to end violent confrontation; and 
the need to keep that agreed peace, typically constituted the first layer of response. 
It also created space for much needed humanitarian activities. The peacekeeping 
operations, initially deployed in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone (albeit by a 
regional grouping – (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group - ECOMOG) and in Somalia (United Nations Operation in Somalia - 
UNOSOM), Rwanda (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda - UNAMIR) and 
Bosnia (The United Nations Protection Force - UNPROFOR) were not intended to 
do much more than maintain a semblance of order.  
Peacebuilding in this regard was essentially conceived as a post-armed 
conflict activity. Boutros-Ghali defined the notion of post-conflict peacebuilding, as 
‘actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.’8 The report of the panel on 
the review of peace operations in 2000 (commonly known as the Brahimi Report), 
further defined peacebuilding as ‘activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to 
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reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those 
foundations, something that is more than just the absence of war.’9 On the face of 
it, one could reasonably expect that the effort to rebuild institutions and reconcile 
a war-affected society could only effectively materialise after warring parties agree 
to a cessation of hostilities and violence has ended. This has since been criticised as 
a limited approach. Peacebuilding occurs all through the cycle of conflict.10 And 
peace operations have since been expanded to include more complex roles as seen 
in the same places – Liberia and Sierra Leone – both of which virtually collapsed. 
The evolutions in UN peacekeeping in the last two decades means that a peace 
operation can be expected to undertake a combination of peacekeeping, robust 
engagement including through enforcement, and peacebuilding. The last few years 
have seen increased reference to “integrated missions” and “stabilisation 
missions,” which are not the immediate focus of this paper. 
The assumptions and explanations as to why these states descended into 
chaos and the character of the intervening actor has tended to influence the path 
taken toward finding stable peace. By far the most dominant assumption is that 
states that experience armed conflict are inherently weak, failing, failed or 
collapsed states.11 As such, stronger and more capable states must be built in order 
to ensure peace and order in those societies. Contemporary ideas of state-building 
have no doubt been predominantly founded on European experiences.12 A state is 
expected to deliver two sets of core functions in order to be deemed strong or 
effective. They are derived from Max Weber’s philosophy of coercive and non-
coercive functions of the state. 13  The coercive functions concern a state’s 
successful claim to the legitimate monopoly of the means of violence. Herein lies 
the capability to enforce extractive functions such as revenue collection, taxation 
or exploiting resources, maintain law and order, and provision of security within a 
given territory.14 The non-coercive functions typically entail provision of social 
goods and services, the durability and efficacy of a state’s governance structures 
and its social and economic redistributive functions.15 A state that fails to deliver 
these core functions is said to be weak. Descent of such a state into armed conflict 
tends to confirm its failure or collapse. It is to these states that international 
peacebuilding efforts have been directed in the last two decades. 
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The reality of the international responses to these conflicts in the last two 
decades is that “state” and “state building” have become intricately connected with 
“peace” and “peacebuilding.” The idea of interrogating the nature of the state and 
state building as part of the search for durable peace is eminently sensible. The 
challenge however is that a particular type of (liberal) state is typically offered as 
the response. And this is often (not in all cases) so detached from the context in 
question. It is difficult to challenge the idea that a governance arrangement is 
required for the maintenance of social order. What is questionable however is that 
a liberal state provides the basis for that social order in all contexts.  
The nature of liberal peacebuilding that is used to reconstitute states after 
conflict in the post-Cold War world is essentially a one-size-fits-all paradigm that is 
used to bring “peace” and “democracy” to war-affected societies. On the surface, 
the idea of supporting societies where conflict has degenerated into violence, to 
pursue their nation building and state building efforts seems logical.  But the 
assumption that one template will suit all conflict situations is faulty at best. This is 
compounded by the fact that contemporary approaches in peacebuilding have 
largely focused on “packaging” efforts meant to transition post-conflict states from 
war to peace and based on itemised “pillars” and “timelines” to be achieved in a 
specific timeframe.16 Ultimately, what is achievable under such circumstances is 
negative peace and not positive peace. Hence the propensity for these states to 
relapse into conflict. The relapse into armed conflict is perhaps the biggest 
dilemma that confronts those seeking to build lasting peace in African (and indeed 
non-African) conflict situations.17 Yet this has come to characterise institutional 
approaches of the United Nations and its partners. 
Oliver Richmond, in the Transformations of Peace, breaks down the 
constituent parts of the liberal peace theory into the following – democratisation, 
human rights, civil society, rule of law and liberalisation most visibly reflected in 
free market reform and development – what Richmond refers to as the ‘technology 
of the liberal peacebuilding process’.18 While it is difficult to dispute a claim for 
people to have equal rights in a society where the rule of law prevails this has 
evolved into a template for building particular types of states. The notion of ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’ has therefore become the framework by which the international 
community seeks to bring peace to war-affected societies.19  
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Roger Mcginty and Oliver Richmond ideas of ‘evolved thinking’ on peace 
and peacebuilding – victor’s peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace and 
civil peace – which they sum up into the ‘conservative’ and ‘orthodox’ models of 
liberal peace.20 The conservative model consists of ‘top down’ approaches to 
peacebuilding and often preferred by international actors, is underlined by 
practices of coercion, domination and hegemony.21 The orthodox model of state 
building, bottom-up on the other hand is sensitive to ‘local ownership’ in the 
building of liberal institutions and more importantly, it includes local actors 
although still inherently top down.22 The top-down approach projects peace ‘as 
being state led… representing top down and bottom up at the same time… with 
emphasis on the former.’23 Indeed as demonstrated elsewhere in this paper, it is 
not inconsistent with the conservative model as it sees the provision of security as 
a starting point and proceeds to undertake peacebuilding ‘based on international 
assumption of technical superiority over its subjects via the claim of normative 
universality of the liberal peace’.24 The bottom up approach, which places 
emphasis on social justice, is its added value.  
In effect, the idea of state-building as peacebuilding and in this regard, the 
liberal state as the ideal form, has been the dominant narrative of the last two 
decades. The extent to which this narrative is consistent with the realities of the 
African environment suited to the realities of African experiences of armed conflict 
is one of the key issues at the core of this paper.  
 
State-building as Peacebuilding: A critique and examination of its relevance to 
Africa  
Liberal peace building has been subjected to serious criticism in the last 
decade although a real debate about alternatives is yet to gain ground. A number of 
gaps are identifiable in the contemporary conceptualisation of peace and state 
building particularly as it relates to Africa.  
Establishing strong and legitimate states is perhaps on of the pre-
occupation of contemporary scholars on Africa. This is underpinned by the 
argument that the main challenges the modern state in Africa confronts with is is 
creation of political order due to lack or weak legitimacy from the population, 
unpopularity of the state; and inability  of the state to consolidate power and 
 
11 
control especially in poor and ethnically heterogeneous populations..25 Therefore, 
the debates essentially focus on the role of the state in provision of security 
particularly state security institutions such as the military and police.26 This 
narrative is not only held in academic discourses, but also reflected amongst 
policymakers affiliated to international development organisations. Implicit in the 
debates is the widely held unilinear view that “failed states” are aberrant in 
managing insecurity, public disorder and lawlessness in their territories, and this 
is not only a source of instability domestically, but also, internationally.27  
The narrative produced in this way has several shortcomings. First, reliance 
on Weberian or neo-Weberian perspectives in understanding the contemporary 
state tends to obscure the social and political realities in these countries, thereby 
failing to capture important conversations taking place between ordinary people 
and governing elite no matter how unstructured the conversations are.28  Cases in 
point are classical approaches taken by international donor agencies in countries 
emerging from conflict. In the 1990’s, for instance, security sector reform (SSR) 
programmes supported by Bretton Woods institutions, mainly focused attention 
on modernising dysfunctional security institutions through three, narrow, yet 
influential approaches guided by an overarching development paradigm that 
aimed at reducing military expenditures, prevention of conflict and post-conflict 
reconstruction, and enhancing public governance.29 Although the programmes 
target poor countries, they have been observed to have invariable outcomes on 
security architecture in these countries largely because, of the failure to recognise 
that, formal state security systems, in most African countries, are implicitly elite 
driven and disconnected from protecting the citizens.30 By excluding the non-
formal security actors and dynamics, this limitation fails to capture the important 
conversations taking place between ordinary people and the ruling elite no matter 
how unstructured and delineated these conversations are.  
Second, despite a broad consensual acknowledgment of the importance of 
state building in the building of peace, particularly in countries affected by 
intermittent conflict, there are a number of tensions that prevent a systematic 
linkage between the two. Researchers observe that there are several complex and 
problematic discords of contemporary state-building approaches, which can be 
summed into six main thematic areas: (1) Hasty state-building processes; (2) 
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undermining of the state institutions in peacebuilding processes; (3) meritocracy 
of Weberian state-building principles;  (4) narrow and overemphasised focus on 
state security actors; (5) Appeasing spoilers in the interest of peace, while 
neglecting the development of a sustainable state and (6) Preference for short-
term transitional mechanisms.31  
Third, contemporary peacebuilding practices, such as internationally or 
regionally sanctioned peace operations are highly institutionalised in their 
approaches.32 These operations tend to focus on post-conflict situations especially 
towards the tail end of conflict. Thus for instance, UN peace operations have 
occurred only in a few African countries and, in some cases, they have either been 
deployed late, have completely ignored festering conflict situations or 
procrastinated as legal technicalities are being debated. 33  Moreover, 
institutionalised operations often tend to be inflexible, limited and unable to 
address several peacebuilding dilemmas like developing adaptable and context 
specific rapid responses as well as inability to handle possibilities of relapse into 
conflict. Indeed, the privileging of the technical aspects of peacebuilding, including 
the building of institutional infrastructure over the politics of relationship building 
and the facilitation of inter-elite and elite-society conversations is a major flaw of 
this approach to statebuilding. 34 
Policy makers in both statebuilding and peacebuilding have previously and 
consistently been criticised for using a top-down approach that more often ignores 
local contexts, informal actors and initiatives which if brought on board could lead 
to longer-term, sustainable, context specific programmes as well as better 
outcomes.35  One of the criticisms is the view that state-building approaches are 
imposed by the major international development organisations, emphasising on 
conventional principles of democratic liberalism, good governance, and economic 
liberalisation.36 While such principles are fundamental, the manner in which the 
approaches are sequenced and promoted is seen as an imposed phenomenon from 
the outside, which tends to inhibit the fundamental rethinking that post-conflict 
(or indeed pre-armed conflict) states require about the nature and purposes of 
political authority.  
 The chequered results of the liberal state-building approach to 
peacebuilding in Africa and elsewhere compel a closer interrogation of this 
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approach and a search for alternative strategies for building and sustaining peace. 
Perhaps one of the most difficult outcomes of peacebuilding efforts, which gives 
pause to peace and security decision-makers is the issue of conflict relapse. In 
many conflict situations in Africa, for example, conflict has relapsed into violence 
within a few years of reaching some form of peace agreement. Some recent 
examples include Burundi, Central African Republic, Mali, South Sudan and Guinea-
Bissau, which experiences recurring instability or collapse of central government. 
Whether or not violent relapse is a result of a particular approach to peacebuilding 
in the first instance – liberal or otherwise – is an unsettled issue. But what is 
apparent is that liberal peacebuilding has tended to leave behind liberal-like 
institutions that are at best caricatures of the liberal democracies that they were 
intended to mirror. The challenge of embedding institutions created by liberal 
peacebuilding in the target society is difficult to overcome without a deep-rooted 
conversation about the terms on which people in that society will live together. 
Invariably, internationally supported processes end up placing statehood and 
sovereignty over qualitative peace. As Oliver Richmond and others have observed 
in places like Cambodia, the end result of liberal peacebuilding is little more than 
virtual peace leaving the potential for a recurrence of the same form of violence 
that it sought to prevent in the first instance. Herein lies the classical peacebuilding 
dilemma – in which there is a chance that in about 50 per cent of cases, violent 
conflicts will resurface.37  
The historical trajectory of African states and societies and the 
conversations that shaped that path are a missing part of the application of state-
building as peacebuilding in that continent. African states in their present form 
were not in existence at the time that Europe’s philosophers through generations 
of conversations and debate in the public sphere, the issue of where sovereign 
power rested and how that power would be exercised. Indeed, African societies 
were under the dominions of various European states for the better part of the last 
century and a half. Under tightly maintained colonial orders, they were owned, 
swapped or inherited by Europe’s sovereign states following the World Wars (e.g. 
Tanzania, Togo and Rwanda). Their participation in debates about sovereignty, 
war and peace only began when they became independent dominions and 
legitimate sovereign states and members of the community of states at the United 
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Nations. However, the question of how those African states emerged, the basis of 
their sovereignty and how the sovereignty is exercised is a subject that is rarely at 
the core of statebuilding and peacebuilding discourse. When many of them have 
fallen into situations of armed conflict in the last decades, a different kind of 
explanation was offered for their calamity.  
The structural roots of the absence of stable peace in Africa run deep. The 
challenge of building peace in African conflicts must be seen within the continent 
and countries’ historical trajectories. The states that were created at the end of 
colonial rule were not the products of conversations in those societies about the 
kind of collective future they would pursue and the terms on which they would live 
together. Instead, they inherited states and systems that were in large part 
removed from the realities of those societies. Security institutions, for example, 
were a wholesale transfer from the colonial order. The transfer of power from 
colonial rule was in essence a change over of one elite grouping for another and 
less about institutional transformation in ways that reflected the collectively 
imagined future of those societies. The intentions underlying the creation of key 
institutions such as the security establishment did not change fundamentally..38 It 
was to this superficial change, for example, that Peter Ekeh alluded when he wrote 
‘colonialism and the two publics: a theoretical statement’, in 1975. He contrasted 
the ‘civic public’ with the ‘primordial public’. The former, he argued, was amoral 
and disconnected from the private realm; while the latter, was moral and 
connected to the private realm. In essence, the civic institutions created under the 
colonial order, were not embedded in the socio-cultural life of the societies over 
which they presided. Four decades later, much of this remains true in many parts 
of Africa.  
The emergence of African states right at the heart Cold War arguably 
influence the paths of their development. The coercive power acquired by the 
many authoritarian regimes, which invariably retained power could not be 
challenged in the face of a Cold War system that supported those rulers on the 
basis of their ideological leanings. With the restraining danger of superpower 
confrontation keeping a lid on the escalation of conflict, structural violence 
festered. And conversations of silence with non-prominent conversable spaces 
were the order of the day. It took the end of the Cold War for a transformation to 
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occur in those spaces. The end of superpower rivalry meant that great power 
support for African leaders no longer occurred on the basis of East-West rivalry. 
New conditionality such as democracy and good governance became the basis for 
support to African states. This meant that the spaces for conversations between 
people and their leaders broadened. Inevitably, violence became a key part of 
those conversations in many places. The brutal armed conflict that accompanied 
some of those violent conversations could not be contained in places like Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Somalia without external intervention aimed at 
achieving stable peace in these countries. Ironically, some of those internal 
interventions would seek to return those countries to the models of statehood that 
characterised colonial transfer of power, without facilitating a deeper conversation 
about the collective future imagined by the target societies.  
This liberal peacebuilding approach is what has been much critiqued by 
prominent studies (**) The most far reaching and introspective of this 
peacebuilding agenda has examined the dynamics of democratization and 
marketization and in the end proposed institutionalization before 
democratization.39 To be certain, this argument is not faulty nor is it illogical.  But 
it fails to take into account that for this institutionalisation to take hold and 
become embedded in the target societies, a non-violent inter-elite and elite society 
conversation must of necessity be charted.40.  
There has been inter-elite and elite-society and elite-outsiders conversation 
and this is segmented and fragmented, reinforcing and contradicting institutions 
with all their complexity. The way situations unfold in practice, thus, reveals these 
complex and context specific paths that cannot be viewed because of the 
dominance of the ‘liberal way of seeing’ that assesses state and peacebuilding 
experience in terms of becoming more or less of the liberal variant. Yet they are 
not qualitatively different whatsoever. However, shifting the analytical lens may 
increase the visibility of alternative ways of looking at actual state and 
peacebuilding practices that would potentially give rise to a different approach to 
peace and state building by local and international actors and hence the need to 
approach the subject from a different perspective.  
Accordingly, we argue for a reframing of the state-building–peacebuilding 
problematique by re-centring the notion of conversation in the processes of 
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building peace and viable states.** As such, peacebuilding conversations are not 
only about building peace but also are essentially about the normative and 
institutional underpinning of the peace (whatever its type).  We argue that state 
institutions, whatever their form, would be embedded in society if and only if they 
are a product of prior conversation about peace and social order among elites and 
between elites and society; and that non-violent conversation tends to usher 
durable peace and patterns of governance. This, we believe, would serve as an 
alternative way of approaching the state building-peacebuilding problematique, of 
course, with a caution or two. First, there had been violent conversations that 
ended up in consolidating state institutions though this is not likely in the 
contemporary period.  Second, once emerged out of violent or non-violent 
conversations institutions in turn shape the kind of conversation a society is to 
have, and the kind of peace or war that follows from it (hence the process is 
essentially path dependent limiting the relevance of one-size-fits-all, template-
based approach to peace and state building). This reframing of orientation brings 
the notion of political settlement to the centre of the debate in the state building 
and peacebuilding endeavour.  
 
 
STATEBUILDING CONVERSATIONS AT THE ROOT OF ARMED CONFLICT – 
IDENTIFYING COMMON TRENDS 
Society’s conversations about an imagined collective future based on shared 
history and the adherence to common values around which individuals can 
cumulate their aspirations – to live well and to live long – invariably produce a 
people’s vision of the “common good”. What is difficult to generalise at any point in 
time is the path that a people or society takes toward the collective attainment of 
this vision. Herein lies the most difficult challenge confronting the dominant 
approaches to the pursuit of stable peace. Crafting the ideal path to peace on the 
basis of another society’s path, shaped by their own struggles, contestations and 
unique lessons is invariably a recipe for failure. This is what the attempt to build 
peace by building a particular model of state in Africa in the last two and a half 
decades reveals.   
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It then becomes possible to conceive of Africa’s post-independence and 
post-Cold War conflicts as in part “conversations” about nation and state-building 
taking place in specific national contexts. The notion of conversation advanced 
here is not restricted to structured, overt and delineated dialogues, discussions or 
exchanges that occur between a variety of actors within society. Rather we are 
particularly interested in the wide-ranging interactions among groups in society – 
however unstructured, unseen and inexplicit – and their resulting signifiers.  The 
logic of peacebuilding must therefore derive from the conversations being had by 
the people of that state and their rulers about the terms on which they will live 
together. These conversations and the manner in which they are being had are at 
the root of much of conflict witnessed in Africa in the five decades since many of 
the states in the region became independent dominions. 
In this paper, we take the position that many of Africa’s post-independence 
and post-cold war conflicts are in part “conversations” about nation and 
statebuilding taking place in the specific national contexts. The notion of 
conversation advanced here is not restricted to structured, overt and delineated 
dialogues, discussions or exchanges that occur among a variety of actors within 
society. Rather, we are particularly interested in the wide-ranging interactions 
among groups in society – however unstructured, unseen and inexplicit – and their 
resulting signifiers. We see these as particular forms of conversations, which occur 
especially in situations where power asymmetry is rife not least between 
populations and those in positions of authority, who preside over them. 
These conversations can be said to be about statebuilding when certain 
types of issues are at the heart of those conversations and when there is an 
indication that they are occurring between particular segments of society. For 
example, existential issues, where the physical or material survival of a group 
might be at stake; the functioning of state institutions and the degree to which they 
are responsive to the needs of the larger population; access to channels of power 
and resources, among many other things. As such, when citizens create alternative 
systems of response to needs deemed to have been neglected by their 
governments or those in authority there is an important conversation to be found 
therein. This is notwithstanding that the absence of a satisfactory response system 
has not been explicitly stated or requested. These conversations might be 
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occurring between particular groups and their government; between groups with 
competing demands in terms of access to state resources; and typically, elite 
groupings struggling for the control of machinery of government, among various 
other things.   
By their very trajectory, the vast majority of African states are the product 
of many difficult conversations first between colonial elites and African peoples 
and societies; and in the post-independence period, between Africa’s inheritance 
elite and their people. Some of the earlier conversations, which led to political 
independence for the societies concerned, were necessarily violent. And not 
surprisingly, in the absence of deliberate, structured dialogue about the terms on 
which groups in the newly independent societies would live together, some of the 
conversations between the post-colonial rulers and their people are not dissimilar. 
The conversations have been concerned with among other things, issues of 
(in)security, (in)justice and their enablers, which reflect the diversity of interests 
in society and as such are invariably gendered, creed or belief-driven, age-based or 
fraught with other identity patterns not least ethnicity and class. These 
conversations occur violently or not, at various levels in these societies between 
elite groupings and/or between ruling elites and segments of society sometimes 
struggling for control of the machinery of state.  
We suggest that by their very nature, these conversations are part and 
parcel of the processes of state and/or nation building in the post-independence 
period. If formal conversations or dialogues between inheritance elite and their 
people did not precede the creation of those states, the very fact of their co-
existence within a set boundary was bound to produce forms of interaction in their 
new situation. There are invariably, competing interests and demands, which 
require mediation while people also demand to have a say in the systems that 
govern their daily lives.  
The place of power and power holders in the mediation of the competing 
demands in these spaces cannot be overstated. Perceived or actual exclusion from 
sources of power and, alongside this, a perception that the demands of certain 
groups are given more priority can lead to open conflict. Failure to achieve 
meaningful participation in the creation of systems that can effectively address 
these differences has produced various forms of responses within society.  
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Typically, those with access to power and channels of redress or expression, 
openly contest for control of the spaces. Others retreat from formal mainstream 
systems to pursue alternative channels of responding to their needs. For example, 
the manifestations of this on issues of security are visible in several areas. One is 
that ordinary people, far removed from access to the protection offered by state 
security establishments then retreat to seek protection from non-state systems, 
which obtain their loyalty. Another is that those who feel excluded and are willing 
to pay for the services of security providers outside of state arrangements. Yet 
another manifestation, and perhaps a more significant one for our purposes, is 
where those who as a result of such perceived exclusion seek to wrest away the 
machinery of the control of the state from current occupiers of the space. These are 
the examples of statebuilding conversations that have escalated into violence. 
Invariably, these conversations remain confined to this elite class/interest group 
such that the rest of society becomes disconnected from the larger conversations. 
Yet they are affected by the impact of those violent conflicts, which typically render 
them displaced, injured or migrating. Trends across Africa reflect the dominance of 
this last scenario. We have thus seen many instances in the post-independence and 
post-Cold War period, where these struggles between segments of power holders 
or elite have battled it out openly. Examples include civil wars in Nigerian, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and most recently Mali and South Sudan.  
It is therefore expected that peacebuilding interventions in such settings 
might seek to transform the dynamics between ruling elite and local populations, 
thus setting them on a common course of nation building. Of the identity patterns 
mentioned above, that of gender is rarely elevated to the top of mainstream 
conflict resolution strategies, while issues such as ethnicity and religion often 
receive considerable attention even if in ways which lack authenticity. Overall, 
however, much of the effort in peacebuilding has been focused on bargaining 
between elite groupings without a fundamental re-ordering of elite mind set and 
approaches in favour of a collective, citizen-centred national agenda. Peacemakers 
have tended to focus an inordinate amount of attention on the need to bring the 
attendant violence to an immediate end. In so doing, they may have inadvertently 
ensured a relapse of violence at a future date.   
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Post-conflict peace and statebuilding efforts in Africa have emerged largely 
from several scenarios: one in which the violence ended through a military 
solution on the battlefield. This does not preclude various shades of external 
support for one side or the other; another in which external intervention helps 
achieve a peace settlement; and yet another in which the arranged peace was the 
product of externally facilitated negotiations between the parties to the violent 
conflict. Whether or not these scenarios offer a chance to bring about a 
transformation in the internal dynamics of the society and thus achieve stable 
peace by returning those affected to a collective conversation about the terms on 
which they can live together peacefully within a viable state is yet to be adequately 
understood. This is perhaps reflected in the classical peacebuilding dilemma – i.e. 
the likelihood that a violent conflict will recur in affected societies within ten years 
of the end of armed conflict – has spurred continued interest in this subject 
globally.41  
Equally, while we have seen a sharp variation in approach between 
contexts that did not witness a heavy external injection of a liberal peace agenda 
and those where peace processes have been shaped or led largely from within, the 
outcomes thus far, have not produced compelling evidence of lasting peace. 
Although there are visible differences in the strengths and viability of the states. A 
closer examination of some of these cases points to different trends. In this regard 
the subject of political or peace settlement becomes an important factor in the 
analysis of these experiences. The question arises as to whether and how the 
nature of the settlement reached to end armed conflict allows for a return to the 
conversations that predated the war.  
 
Connecting political/peace settlement to the notion conversation 
Before examining the connection between political or peace settlement and 
conversation, it is important to clarify this paper’s understanding of, and use of 
political and peace settlement. As employed in much of contemporary scholarly 
and international development literature, political settlement has its origin in 
political economy discourses. 42  The majority of perspectives on political 
settlements especially in peace studies are non-static events or processes of 
negotiation(s), after war, mainly between elites of rules governing the distribution 
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of rights and privileges.43 More prominent, is the literature on settlements after 
termination of war. Although these studies vary widely, they can be summed under 
three major themes. First is the way in which war terminates; second concerns the 
effects of the types of war termination strategy on the nature of post-war peace 
and state building; and third is the durability of peace after war.44 Studies focusing 
on the type of peace settlement tend to argue that military victories are less 
exposed to war recurrence as compared with negotiated settlements. However, the 
relationship between types of settlement and the durability of peace is not yet a 
settled issue. This is what the notion of conversation further interrogates in this 
paper.  
The political settlement discourse distinguishes the concept as structurally 
different between developed and developing countries, where it has been argued 
that political settlement in ‘all developing countries’ is ‘rent-seeking’ and ‘client’ 
based and, power is exercised through informal patron-client organisations.45 
However, such neo-patrimonialitic discourses according to Adebayo Olukoshi 
analyse African politics, economy and society on the basis of inta alia distinct 
binominal oppositions like, the formal and the informal, hardly give ‘useful for 
understanding the logic of politics’.46 Furthermore, they fail to acknowledge the 
‘existence of a political community in Africa that is characterised by diversity, 
contestation, sacrifice and visions of a better society’, and such a discourse, he 
notes, ‘limits the capacity of students to pay serious attention to the struggles that 
give meaning to politics in contemporary Africa and which propel the process of 
change.’47 Therefore, with the above in mind, it is crucial to formulate an 
appropriate understanding relevant to the African context. 
Here, we use political and peace settlements interchangeably but privilege 
the use of peace settlement given the significant attention placed on the trajectory 
of conversations that lead to stable peace. We understand peace settlement as an 
activity or decisive action that marks the end of armed conflict or a transition from 
violent conflict to the pursuit of conflict by non-violent means. This decisive 
moment embodies, implicitly or explicitly, the terms under which conflicting 
parties would live together regardless of the extent to which these terms are 
consensual or imposed. Every political order, however dictatorial, depends on 
some sort of acceptance, as there is the possibility to subvert imposition from 
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above no matter how grave the consequences might be. Thus, this helps us to 
discern not only the processes through which terms of shared lives or/and 
agreement come about but also the substantive content of the arrangement by 
which contending groups live together. We do not presume, at the outset, that such 
an arrangement would be procedurally and substantively better in negotiated 
settlement than victory based ones. The only point we wish to emphasise is that 
such an arrangement, drawing from Khan is supported by the power balance 
among contending actors taking external influence into account.48  
Nonetheless, understood as the decisive event marking the end of armed 
conflict and the introduction of a new political order, political settlements does not 
simply refer to the way war terminates but also the changes in the warring actors 
and their relationship during the course of the termination.49 This refers to 
changes in the organizational, ideological and mobilization capacity and will of 
warring actors, the inclusiveness of the actors and/processes ushering in the 
termination, and the level of consensus in the arrangement by means of which a 
transitioning society is going to live together.50 This understanding is informed by 
the assumption that the end of civil war is not only about the end of armed activity 
but also is about change in a range of organizational and political dynamics. 
Understood this way, our definition combines elements that simultaneously 
exclude and include, compare and contrast the two types of settlements.51 By this, 
we mean, first, settlements based on victory are presented to be qualitatively 
different from settlement based on negotiation and in this sense we can compare 
processes giving rise to that decisive moment marking a transition to another form 
of order and the extent this shapes consequent processes of conversations, violent 
or otherwise, about peace and state building.  
            The normative, institutional, organizational as well as relational forms these 
conversations are manifested in and are materialized through is an essential 
aspect of the process that set countries on different trajectories to peace and state 
building. At one level, they are the manifestation of these conversations and at 
another level they are the medium through which these conversations are 
materialized. In other words, once in existence they shape the kind of conversation 
to be had and they manifest the kind of conversation that had been going on. 
Arrangements that institutionalized a particular form of governance (ethnic 
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federalism in Ethiopia, devolution in Kenya, justice management in Rwanda, 
resource governance in Sierra Leone), for instance, indicate the kind of 
conversation that was central before and during the peace settlement and at the 
same time shapes the subsequent conversations to be had. By examining the extent 
to which particular peace settlements took into account the deep seated 
conversations that preceded and led to armed conflict and the degree to which 
these were addressed in the post-settlement periods, we might better understand 
the basis for stable peace and viable states in these societies.  
 
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM RESPONSES TO AFRICAN CONFLICTS?  
We have argued that the narratives behind the trajectory of nation or state-
building in African states vis-à-vis normative peace and state building intervention 
strategies particularly in countries affected by armed conflict are disconnected. 
The (un) intended assumption in externally driven post-conflict interventions is 
that the pathway to peace is ending or controlling of violence and building 
institutions that enforce it. A critical analysis of this logic in armed conflict 
environments however reveals a number challenges not least that of conflict 
relapse. By offering here several snapshots of situations of armed conflict where 
peacebuilding interventions had various other perspectives, we seek to address 
some lingering questions. Central to this is the extent to which particular forms of 
peace settlement are able to return to the nation and state building conversations 
that lie at the root of conflict and thus whether they offer a path to stable peace.  
 
The following key questions are considered in discussing some illustrative 
examples of peace settlements in Africa: 
 
 What state building issues and conversations led to armed conflict/ war? 
 What is the nature of the peace or political settlement that emerged to bring 
the war/ armed conflict to an end? 
 To what extent did the peace settlement address the state building 
conversations that led to war? 
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 Did the post- (armed) conflict agenda or approach sustain the dominant 
narratives and approaches to peace and state-building or did they 
emphasise an alternative narrative and approach?  
 What indications are there that the peace achieved is stable/ sustainable? 
  
Somalia/Somaliland 
Somalia perhaps provides a unique case where two regions of the same republic–
Southern region (Trust Territory of Somalia) and Somaliland, the Northern region, 
(British Somaliland)–exemplify the paradoxes of externally-led versus internally-
driven peacebuilding processes. Since the fall of General Siyad Barre authoritarian 
rule in 1991, Somalia, particularly the Southern region has continued to face 
periodic violent conflict. 52  The intermittent conflict have occurred despite 
numerous externally-driven military and non-military interventions. In contrast, 
following the Somalia National Movement’s (SNM) led armed struggle against 
Barre’s brutal rule in Somaliland, the region has had relatively stable, largely 
internally-driven and indigenous processes of building peace. The contradictions 
mirror varied state-building trajectories between the two regions that emerged 
from the colonial period and continued through the post-colonial period. The state 
governance system established by the British Colonial authorities in the North was 
characterised by transparent institutions but more reliant on indirect rule through 
clans while in the Southern region, the Italians preferred on dominant rule over 
clans.53  
One of the major outcomes of this rule was the destruction of traditional social and 
political institutions governance and in its place was establishment of a centralised 
system of administration. Furthermore, the varied post-colonial politics of 
distributing influential government positions to elites based on clan identity which 
also implicitly meant access to resources such as land, sore discord and conflict 
between dominant clans as well as further alienating Somaliland from Mogadishu 
in the South.54 Nonetheless, since the collapse, Somalia has been deeply divided 
along clan-based movements and various armed groups who jostle to exert 
control. Responses to the conflicts in Southern region collapse of the state have 
mainly been bottom up and top down interventions to the peace process with elites 
and external actors both at international and regional level preferring the latter 
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with an aim at re-establishing a strong centralist national state in Somalia.55 The 
top down approaches have seen numerous military and non-military intervention 
including the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) 1992-93 and United Nation 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II in 1992 and 1995, as well as the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).56  Non-military interventions have seen a 
plethora of mediation conference that have produced and reproduced accords, the 
majority held in and facilitated by neighbouring countries – Djibouti, Addis Ababa 
and Kenya.57  
However, while these interventions made short-term gains for instance, delivering 
humanitarian assistance at the height of the war, they encountered major set-
backs especially inability of to understand the complexities and political dynamics 
of the conflict.58 In addition, some of the initial peace agreements focused on 
establishing UN’s blueprints of rebuilding a central democratic government. In 
spite of the interventions, they have failed in preventing persistence of violent 
conflicts especially in South-Central Somalia.59 This has resulted to several 
dilemmas. First is the need to focus more on political and socio economic issues 
rather than military approaches; 60 Second is the lack of representation in the 
largely elite driven peace settlement processes which have led to challenges in 
implementation of peace agreements. Third is reliance on external fund to support 
peace processes especially in the South Central region. This contrasts with 
indigenously driven peace process in Somaliland and to a significant extent in 
Puntland. The processes are largely community-led, organised and funded by 
Somali’s.61  The main pitfall of externally-funded support is that peace actors have 
little investment and ownership of the process and implementation of outcomes. 
The inability of externally-driven interventions, to end violent conflict have not 
only increased insecurity due to inability of security forces to enforce the law, but 
have in the past influenced re-emergence of informal governance systems (local 
Shari’a Courts) in South Central Somalia and locally-led intervention or bottom up 
or “building block” approaches to peace in Somaliland.62  The latter process has 
been implemented in Somaliland peacebuilding process as well as in building 
blocks for political and administrative structures in Northern region such as 




Unlike in Southern Somalia where a US and UN backed peacekeeping mission 
intervened to restore peace and order, in Somaliland, the main insurgent group, 
Somali National Movement (SNM), entrusted the process of post-conflict 
reconstruction and nation-building to the Guurti — council of elders.64 This 
process led to establishment of a community based system of government that 
integrated both Western and traditional forms of governance institutions.65 
Furthermore, although the reconciliation process was not without challenges, 
whereby areas such as Burao and Berbera threatened to protract back to conflict, 
the Guurti, using informal but holistic reconciliatory initiatives, played an 
important role in restoring stability between inter-clan rivalries.66   
This approach is unique in several ways not widely discussed. For instance, 
the initial process of crucial clan reconciliation conferences was locally financed 
through community self-help systems with limited external financial assistance.67 
Conversely, the first one-year UN Mission in Somalia deployed in central and 
southern regions had a net expenditure of 42.9 million dollars.68  Additionally, 
another area often alluded to, but inadequately scrutinized in State building 
narratives, is the role of women in political and economic development in 
Somaliland. Some initial studies for example suggest after the war, the position, 
expectations and agency of women agency has been significantly altered and there 
are trends of women increasingly playing active rather than passive roles in socio-
economic spheres.69 This must be critically challenged however since socio-
economic roles rarely translates to holistic emancipation for women in patriarchal 
societies. To be certain, Somaliland’s endogenous nation-building processes are 
not without faults. Doubts have been cast on the extent to which Somaliland’s 
hybrid system especially the traditional and clan-based system can produce a 
legitimate, inclusive and democratic political order.70  While there is truism in 
these criticisms, it is evidently clear that minimal external intervention allows for 
self-organisation necessary, which is a crucial pillar for attaining mutual consensus 
and building legitimacy in governance.71   
 
Rwanda 
In Rwanda a decade after the tumultuous and brutal armed conflicts in the mid-
1990s and the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, the state has remained relatively 
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stable. The stability has allowed Rwanda to implement wide-ranging reforms 
particularly in improving and strengthening peace and security of the country and 
in certain cases the region as well as bridging social inequalities, especially gender 
disparities of its citizens.  The state has, for example, been implementing 
progressive socioeconomic policies anchored on the externally influenced 
approaches such as millennium development goal.72 Emphasis has been on 
formalising the informal, that is, integrating local solutions, citizen participation 
and governance which is channelled through initiatives such as Gacaca Courts; 
Umuganda or community service monthly day; Itorero ry’ Igihugu, an Institute for 
civic education; and Ubudehe, a ‘system of intra-community co-operation based on 
collective and individual actions’.73  
There are varied attributions to this trend. First is that as research has 
shown since the pre-colonial times and until the genocide in 1994, identities and 
reconstruction of “ideas of identity” have been at the core of Rwanda’s nation- and 
state-building conversation.74 These conversations have over the time evolved 
from pre-colonial conversations of the constantly shifting identities of who is a 
Hutu, Tutsi or Twa,75 to the assigning of identities by the colonial authorities, 
which resulted in inequalities due to preferential treatment accorded mainly to 
Tutsi.76 Although the post-colonial period presented an opportunity for Rwanda to 
reverse the changes on identity structures during the colonial period, the now 
Hutu-led First and Second Republics used the state institutions to reproduce the 
same ethnic identities, structures and institutions to systematically repress the 
Tutsi. The marginalization of the Tutsi not only led to resentment and reaction that 
led to the brutal civil war and genocide, but also laid ground for post-genocide 
conversation on state and building.  
These conversations have centred on various state-building efforts aimed 
towards restoration of peace and security after the genocide.77  Furthermore while 
on one hand a perspective fronted is that considerable elements of the ‘successes’ 
in Rwanda’s statebuilding agenda can be attributed to for instance on foreign aid 
and this may be detrimental to peacebuilding both nationally and regionally.78 On 
the other hand, the nature of the political settlement — victory and assent to 
power of the RPF—has allowed an uninterrupted space of the state to implement 
these reforms.79 However, while the RPF has allowed these conversations the elite 
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bureau had been adamant in managing these conversible spaces and has 
consistently forbidden certain controversial issues  including on political 
prisoners, the question on identities especially of Hutu’s or other Rwandan’s killed 
outside the genocide, freedom of the media, the murder of former RPF ruling elites 
among others. 80. Furthermore,  as seen in Rwanda’s peace negotiations processes 
leading to the Arusha accords, the processes emphasised on state-centric 
frameworks and therefore that told us little about societal narratives of state 
building; and secondly their interpretation of the state is limited by reliance on 
neoliberal and Westphalian ideas of state functions.  
A different view of the country suggests that not only does the state 
building process face an array of challenges but has also ingeniously developed 
unique ways of confronting these challenges.  Considering for instance the country 
is densely populated and has limited land available to sustain the bulging 
population settlement of returning refugees has been a thorny and complex issue. 
The need to carefully manage on the one hand donor reservations on land 
resettlement policies and on the other the varied and complex identities of 
returning refugees saw the government develop an emergency imidugudu (a 
villagisation programme). Although the programme was far from perfect not only 
did contribute towards solving the housing problem but also provide critical 
lessons on settlement policies need to be flexible and respond to local diversities.81 
Nevertheless, while the country has made some progress in targets like eradication 
of poverty and improving access to healthcare for rural populations, issues such as 
addressing youth unemployment remain a challenge.82 Estimates suggest that 42 
per cent of young people who constitute around 40% of the population are 
unemployed.83 While the government has initiated aggressive land tenure and 
agricultural reforms crucial to Rwanda’s post-war development, research suggests 




Since separating from Sudan and establishing the state of South Sudan (SS),85 
doubts have been rife on whether the two will fully realise recommendations of 
the peace settlement—Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA) signed by the 
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Sudan government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army SPLM/A in 2005 after decades of civil war.86 Above all there are 
uncertainties on ability and viability of SS to function as a state. The colonial 
administration’s disengagement with South Sudan, left institutional and  
instrumental  constraints  for successive regimes in Khartoum to  unify disparate  
ethnic  nationalities in the territory  into  a  'modern' nation-state.87 Attempts to 
consolidate the state ended up in centralising power, resources and governance in 
the capital, while politically and economically excluding other regions, including 
South Sudan. Consequentially, this bred discontent and agitation for separation 
mainly from the South.88  
However for a long time the separatist movements lacked homogeneity due 
to ethnic, religious and linguistic cleavages in the movement. This led to number of 
intellectuals and elites were able to mobilize political groups, formed rebel 
militants and organised revolt against the Northern based government, which 
culminated to two major civil wars.89  The initial civil war which began in 1952 -
1976, led by South Sudan liberation insurgent movement - Anya Nya, gave South 
Sudan regional autonomy after the vicious war ended with signing the Addis 
Ababa Accord. However despite Southern Sudan being granted regional autonomy, 
power was still excessively concentrated within the autocratic Khartoum 
government and political exclusion of the South still continued. Consequently, the 
grievances which had built up from flouting of the peace accord, were sparked by 
the Northern government move to introduce Sharia Law among the predominant 
Christian Southerners. This led to the second resistance and longest civil war 
against the Sudan government, which began in 1983, and was led by SPLM/A 
leader, the late John Garang.  
The war ended in 2005 after the two parties signed formally the CPA 
agreement. The agreement among other resolutions not only laid transition 
foundations for a secession, but more importantly, was for the two government to 
oversee proper demarcation of the North-South border, particularly the contested, 
volatile and yet resource rich areas of Abyei in Bahr el Ghazal region; resolution of 
the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States; and modalities of sharing 
the revenue from the oil in Abyei and Kordofan. Nonetheless, now that Southern 
Sudan has formally gained independence, the two remaining challenges mentioned 
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still lay ahead, and appear as a the greatest threat to sustainability of the peace. 
Therefore will post-conflict South Sudan be able to function alone as a State, 
govern itself and sustain the peace in the long term?  
Despite gaining independence from Sudan, conflict in South Sudan has 
intensified and significantly transformed, by acquiring new agendas and attracted 
varied actors. Conflicts have recurred not only with Sudan in volatile and disputed 
area of Abyei but since 2013 the SS government is facing a major rebellion in key 
areas such as the capital Juba, and oil rich towns including Bor, Malakal and Bentiu.  
The conflicts have tragically led to enormous loss of life, violation of fundamental 
human rights, displacements and high social-economic costs to both South Sudan 
and bordering countries. The conflict can no longer be viewed solely as an 
insurgency war, or largely as fuelled by racial, ethnic and religious feuds, but has 
also, intensified due to proliferation of small arms and light weapons; acquired 
political and economic agendas due to oil and other resources; as well as 
regionalized due to instability in neighbouring countries. Therefore, the critical 
question is how will South Sudan rebuild itself from decades of conflict?  
 
Sierra Leone  
Today Sierra Leone is at a critical stage in its post-war transition. Although it is 
regarded as a model of post-conflict reconstruction, challenges of building state 
institutions ravaged by endemic elitism, greed, corruption and nepotism still 
remain patent.90  Furthermore, while the relative stability following the end of the 
protracted civil war, in 2002, has allowed achieving of some socio-economic 
milestones; the recovery pace appears suffers from major challenges especially in 
consolidating peace and the march towards security and development.91 At the 
core of Sierra Leone conversations on state-building has been first, identity 
conversation in the quest for nationhood that emerged from ethono-regional 
divisions created during British colonial rule and later instrumentalised by elites’ 
competitive and self-seeking politics during the post-colonial period. 92  The 
concomitant post-independence state was organised along ethnic identities and 
dominated by divisive political culture that fragmented the society into ethnic and 
regional alliances rather than establish a collective national identity. 93 Coupled 
with the reliance on state resources, corruption, exclusionary and repressive rule 
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to consolidate power, post-independence regimes put the country on a violent 
precipice that eventually culminated into civil war. In addition, management of the 
country’s natural resources was permeated by culture of corruption and elite 
greed. In addition to lack credible democracy, marginalisation of rural and regional 
conflicts, studies note that conversations over contestations of how to manage of 
one of the contributing cause of the conflict.94   
However, proper governance in the country is still an imperative and 
unfulfilled objective. The wider view today is that the issues that predated the 
conflict that is patrimonialism, lack of the rule of law and lack of transparency, 
corruption in the mining sector among others are still present in the post conflict 
state and state-building conversations. 95  Moreover, key sectors of central 
government such as health sector as observed in the country’s management of the 
Ebola outbreak still remains largely dysfunctional,96 and corruption, intolerance as 
well as political exclusion remain rampant.97 Furthermore, although the country 
has experienced substantial economic growth in recent years, poverty and 
underdevelopment remain major challenges. More importantly despite the 
exclusion of the youth into the political and socio-economic development having 
been previously identified as one of the major contributing factors into the war, 98 
the pace of rebuilding institutions that facilitated youth participation is incredibly 
slow and is often playing catch-up in constantly changing youth dynamics..99 
Among the issues includes the alarmingly high level of poverty, unemployment and 
especially among the youth, high inequalities levels particularly among women and 
other vulnerable groups.100 These challenges threaten the already fragile peace.  
Perhaps one major challenge worth interrogation is the peace process that 
culminated with the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 7 July 1999. The 
agreement, which was cast as a solution to the conflict with two components: 
military resolution, through the disarmament of combatants; and political 
settlement, by implementing a power-sharing arrangement ended up as a failure 
with neither of the parties honouring the provisions.101 Although there have been 
previous attempts to explain the why the accord failed;102and thereby attributing 
the end of the civil war to the belated UK’s military intervention, one question that 
remains unanswered is the how long the ‘stability dividend’ will last. Despite the 
huge external  donor support and internal societal confidence that was accorded in  
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setting up of various institutions  as well as passing of legislation to promote 
equality including that of gender,  is the ability of these institutions to run 
effectively and independently of political interferences remains a huge concern.103,  
Additionally, as pointed out elsewhere, in the event of such conundrums––failed 
political agreements and delayed international intervention, what is the fate of 
citizens and future peace under elite driven political settlements?104 
CONCLUSION  
The logic of statebuilding is to be found in the conversations occurring within the 
target state; it cannot be built on a generic model/ template or the result will be a 
“hit and miss” Peacemaking and peacebuilding in this regard are inherently about 
the commitments of people and their leaders to a particular kind of future. In the 
absence of such commitments, any intervention aiming to build particular kinds of 
institutions of state, with the aim of mitigating violent conflict, is invariably built 
on weak foundations and has a greater likelihood of failure. The key question 
therefore is whether or not the kind of peace that is designed reflects the 
commitment of a cross section of the population to work toward a viable and 
peaceful state. In this paper, we have shown that peacebuilding is not an end itself 
nor is it simply about ending violence. It should ideally be about mediating the 
conversations (violent or otherwise) between people and their rulers in their bid 
to evolve workable systems and viable states that meet the needs of the whole of 
society rather than a few.  
Initial observations suggest that conflicts that were the result of 
negotiations with heavy external facilitation such as in Sierra Leone and South 
Sudan, tend to project the dominant narrative; while conflicts that were the 
product of internal negotiations and processes as well as those that ended in 
victory on the battlefield tend to support the alternative narrative at the core of 
this paper. The degree to which all of these generate sustainable peace is another 
matter altogether. Indeed, these settlements and in fact the violent conflict that 
they were designed to address are a part of the state building conversations 
occurring in the target African contexts. In this regard, the peace settlement then 
becomes a unique set of conversations that is presumed to have lasting effect on 
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